As in Hamlet, the Prince of a rotten State, everything begins by the apparition of a specter. More precisely, by the waiting for this apparition. The anticipation is at once impatient, anxious, and fascinated….
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When I finally sit down to listen to the recording and thus to encounter Austin's ghost through the medium of his voice, I am surprised by the veil of essentialism that taints my expectation. Like most performance studies scholars, I have closely dissected the deconstructionist readings of Austin by Jacques Derrida, Shoshana Felman, Judith Butler and their followers (See: Derrida 1988 , Butler 1993 , and Felman 2003 . Like any theorist working on the relationship between orality and writing, I am wary of the logocentric valorization of the voice due to its proximity to the transcendental source. I know better than to bestow upon this recording any sort of epistemological superiority over the written word. Yet as I sit down to listen to Austin, it press play on my iTunes, and the recording begins.
Austin's Theory of the Performative Utterance
The Gothenburg recording, the BBC transcript "Performative Utterances", and the published text How To Do Things With Words, represent three iterations of the same thesis: that of the performative utterance. Of these three documents, How To Do Things With Words is by far the most detailed and extensive elaboration. In it, Austin begins by introducing his concept of the performative utterance by way of contrast with the constative utterance, or descriptive statement. In his second lecture, Austin proposes six conditions that must be met in order for a performative to be deemed "felicitous", or successful. From here on in, he embarks on the project of determining a set of grammatical or lexical criteria that define the performative utterance. This search, however, ends in an impasse, with Austin concluding that the constative utterance is also prone to infelicity while the performative also relies upon certain conventions. Forced to accept the collapse of his performative/constative dichotomy, Austin concludes that it is tautological to speak of performative language: "Once we realize that what we have to study is not the sentence but the issuing of an utterance in a speech situation, there can hardly be any longer a possibility of not seeing that stating is performing an act" (Austin 1975, 139) .
From this point on, Austin decides to look beyond the propositional content of the sentence and to "consider the total situation in which the utterance is used" (Austin 1975, 52) . This leads to PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 2 (2) (2017)
another system of classification: the tripartite division of "locution", "illocution" and "perlocution", which articulates the three axes of language that come into play in communication. "Locution"
refers to the semantics of a given utterance, "illocution" to the act performed in saying something (in other words to what the utterance does), and "perlocution" to the effects or consequences produced by the utterance. From here, Austin advances a last taxonomy, this time to elucidate families of speech acts; "verditives" which pronounce judgment, "exercitives" which assert power, "commissives" which communicate obligation or intention, "behabatives" which adopt an attitude, and "expositives" which elucidate arguments (Austin 1975, 151) .
Thursday Evenings and Saturday Mornings: Austin's Performative Praxis of "Linguistic

Phenomenology"
How To Do Things With Words concludes with a typical Austinian gesture. Admitting that the thesis expounded in the book is "bound to be a little boring and dry to listen to and digest", Austin ends with the following invitation: "… I leave to my readers the real fun of applying it in philosophy" (Austin 1975, 164) . As an Oxford philosopher, or "ordinary language philosopher", Austin was concerned first and foremost with everyday language use-with "what we say when, and so why and what we should mean by doing it" (Austin 1961, 129) . However, well aware that many philosophers outside his circle were skeptical of the idea that it is possible to make ontological claims about the world through an analysis of mere words, Austin came up with the term "linguistic phenomenology" to describe his methodology:
When we examine what we should say when, what words we should use in what situations, we are looking again not merely at words (or 'meanings' whatever they may be) but also at the realities we use the words to talk about: we are using a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of, though not as the final arbiter of, the phenomena. For this reason I think it might be better to use, for this way of doing philosophy, some less misleading name… for instance "linguistic phenomenology". (Austin 1961, 130) Thus, although he was working within the tradition of Analytic philosophy, Austin borrowed a term from the Continental tradition to thematize his practice. Here, it is of interest to mention that in (Berlin 1973, 9) . Topics broached included perception, a priori truths, counter-factual statements, and the question of personal identity. For Sir Isaiah
Berlin, who participated in the gatherings, these meetings represented "the most fruitful discussions of philosophy" of his life (Berlin 1973, 9) . In Berlin's account, the meetings marked the beginning of what would become known as the school of "Oxford Philosophy" (Berlin 1973, 9 Warnock contends that Austin saw philosophy as a "co-operative pursuit" (Warnock 1989, 9) . In his words, Austin:
… was not a purveyor or explainer, however competent or critical or learned, of philosophy; he was a maker of it, an actual origin. One had the feeling -not always, but often -that those meetings, which were so unmistakably his own, were not occasions on which philosophy was talked about, or taught, or learned -they were occasions on which it was done, at which that actually happened, there and then, in which the life of the subject consists.... (Warnock 1989, 45 ) PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 2 (2) (2017) of the Thursday evening and Saturday morning sessions, we are given a glimpse of Austin performing philosophy as a social act. Here, philosophy becomes a form of "collective labour" that privileges the dialogic and the intersubjective (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy).
Austin's Performativity
Interestingly, all three authors of the prosopographical accounts of Austin's teaching have made special mention of his authority. In his description of the Saturday morning sessions, Warnock describes an ambiance marked by a particular tension between formality and informality. With regards to Austin's comportment, he writes that he "cannot think of any comparable instance of personal authority so effortlessly exercised" (Warnock 1973, 32) . George Pitcher expresses the same sentiment, almost verbatim, when he writes that he has "never before, or since, witnessed a comparable display of natural authority" (Pitcher 1973, 21) . While the meetings were said to be "exceptionally fluid, free… continuously enjoyable and amusing -funny, in fact", Warnock adds that they were "never just casual, and not even really relaxed" and that "it was always just a little as if the headmaster were present" (Warnock 1973, 32-33) . In describing the format of the Saturday morning sessions, Pitcher reports that "the physical and dialectical centre of gravity located itself, predictably, in the person of Austin" explaining that Austin "sat in a wooden armchair with the rest of us deployed in a rough semicircle facing him. And the discussion inevitably assumed the shape of the physical layout: the remarks of the others seemed to be directed not to the group as a whole but to Austin…" (Pitcher 1973, 21) .
The authority of the speaker, which Austin is reported to have embodied, is in fact one of the requirements of a successful Austinian performative utterance. In Austin's theory, performativity concerns the illocutionary level of language, which-unlike the locutionary and the perlocutionary-is governed by its conventional nature. In Austin's paradigmatic example of the marriage ceremony, a ritualistic and legal question is posed and marriage is then "performed" by means of a linguistic act. The success of this performative, however, depends upon the speaker's adherence to a set of conventions, several of which implicate the very identity of the speaker.
Agency is not bestowed upon just anyone, but accompanies a certain privilege. Success is attributed to "certain persons" in "certain circumstances" -persons who are "appropriate" and who perform a given action "correctly" (Austin 1975, 16) . Although Austin's theories did not consider this in the 1950s, these conditions anticipate the question of whether agency might arise from the performative act. Although the Austinian subject clearly preexists its acts, an examination of how Austin himself performed his thought suggests that his work anticipated the deconstructive theories of performativity propounded by Derrida and Butler in which agency comes into existence performatively.
The success or "felicity" (in Austin's terms) of the Austinian illocutionary act relies upon the ethos of the speaker-not only upon his identity, character and ego, but also upon his authority. The PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 2 (2) (2017) speaker's agency is dependent upon his or her presence: "something" is "being done by the person uttering… at the moment of uttering" (Austin 1975, 60 It is the woman who is "taken" as wife and the man who does the taking (Miller 2001, 50-51) . Queer theorists Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Andrew Parker have also drawn attention to the heteronormative implication of exemplifying the marriage ceremony. For them, Austin's marginalization of the fictional bespeaks a homophobic rejection of the "perverse" (Sedgwick and Parker 1995, 5) .
In any case, Austin's own privilege is manifested in his theory of performativity, and he embodied the condition of authority.
Interestingly, however, Pitcher writes that in his lectures, Austin "resorted to no stage effects of any kind", and Warnock makes a point of stating that Austin "could not bear histrionics" (Pitcher, Warnock 1973, 18 and 43) . Thus, while Austin enacted his theory of performativity in a performative manner, it is also notable that he avoided theatricality. In fact, as is well known, Austin completely excluded the theatrical, and the fictional in general, from his theory of performativity. This is made clear in the follow paragraph from How To Do Things With Words, which has been cited ad infinitum by theatre scholars:
… as utterances our performatives are also heir to certain other kinds of ill which infect all utterances. And these likewise, though again they might be brought into a more general account, we are deliberately excluding. I mean, for example, the following: a performative utterance will, for example, be in a peculiar way hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in a soliloquy. This applies in a similar manner to any and every utterance-a seachange in special circumstances. Language in such circumstances is in special ways-intelligibly-used not seriously but in ways parasitic upon its normal useways which fall under the doctrine of the etiolations of language. All this we are excluding from consideration. (Austin 1975, 21-22) Although Derrida's critique of Austinian performativity clearly demonstrated the problems of interpretive models based on authorial intention, Austin's more recent readers have dedicated much textual space to questioning the motivations behind his choice of the hardly benevolent terms "parasitic" and "etiolation" (Derrida 1988 ). Shannon Jackson sees in Austin's work the propagation of a kind of "anti-theatrical performativity" situated within many "anti-theatrical PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 2 (2) (2017) prejudices that have vexed Western intellectual history" (Jackson 2004, 186) . For Andrew Parker and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, the fact that despite Austin's attempts to marginalize the fictional, he relied upon it to construct his arguments, demonstrates that performativity has been "from its inception already infected with queerness" (Parker and Sedgwick 1995, 5) . Literary theorist Shoshana Felman, on the other hand, stages Austin as a rebel of sorts, and accuses his selfprofessed "heirs" (in a footnote she cites John Searle and H.P Grice) of failing to recognize the true performative dimension of his humor (Felman 2003, 99 Performativity's "Bifurcated History"
Few publications, multiple lecture series given at universities around the world, a tradition of Thursday evening and Saturday morning meetings, and a talk on the national radio station… the Austin that emerges from this portrait is one who clearly preferred to produce and disseminate his research on performative utterances orally, dialogically, collectively, and pedagogically as opposed to publishing it in written form. Why might this be?
While by our contemporary standards, it might be tempting to attribute Austin's slim publication record to his lack of productivity as a scholar, I believe that historical context may help to clarify how scholarly conditions informed both Austin's choice of the modes with which he disseminated his works and the dramaturgical structures he deployed within them. Firstly, it appears that not publishing was common to the culture of Oxford philosophy at Austin's time. According to Austin's disciple, the American philosopher John Searle, who earned his Ph.D. as a Rhodes scholar at Oxford and went on to make the most important contribution to the field of speech act theory following Austin's death, "Oxford had a long tradition of not publishing during one's lifetime, indeed it was regarded as slightly vulgar to publish" (Searle 2007, 227) . leads his readers through a series of methodological steps, often working by processes of exclusion in order to push an idea to its limits. We thus observe the philosopher thinking in the present tense, and we think alongside him in real time. Throughout the exposition of his ideas, Austin repeatedly confronts impasses. We, as his readers, become spectators to the dramatization of both the construction of his ideas and their breakdown, as in the case of the theoretical collapse of the performative/constative binary. Since Austin had already worked through these logical processes before the lectures were given, he clearly chose to restage them for his audience. This choice required a narrative form of writing that emphasized the processual nature of performativity.
J. Hillis Miller calls attention to the fact that Austin's work is situated within a strong philosophical tradition, reminding us that Plato's Dialogues also continually end at impasses in which Socrates proposed that they must take up the subject again at a later time. Miller cites the end of Protagoras, in which Socrates realized that virtue cannot be taught, as a parallel to Austin's inexhaustible attempts at reaching his goal (Miller 2001, 23) . For Judith Butler, Austin displays "compulsive efforts to scrap the latest conceptual architectonic in favor of a new one". She goes on to say that: "He is not sure of his way, and he leaves the legacy of his misfires on the page for us to read" (Butler in Felman 2013, 121) . Shoshana Felman affirms this, observing that: "Austin's research is modeled on anaphora, on repetition and beginnings", and that a finite goal or conclusion is never reached. For her, the fact of needing to constantly begin again puts the very act of research into the realm of the performative, as opposed to the constative (Felman 2013, 42-3) . The performative nature of research is only heightened when the research concerns the concept of performativity, which
Austin himself had shown could not be judged by its truth conditions. As Felman asks: "How, indeed, might one find the truth of that which, as such, deconstructs the criterion of truth itself?" (Felman 2013, 43) .
In this sense, despite his dogged pursuit of clarity, Austin clearly avoided traditional, formal, and logical structures. One could say that he never arrives at propounding an argument, per se, ending his lecture, as I have mentioned, by offering to his readers "the real fun of applying it in philosophy" (Austin 1975, 164) . Within this invitation, or solicitation, we may unearth a dialogical impulse, but also a pedagogical one. Austin was known to be an excellent teacher, and his influence was surely more widespread in this domain than it was through his publications. Austin began teaching philosophy at Oxford in 1935 and continued until his death. According to Berlin, it was his first classes that marked "the true beginning of Austin's career as an independent thinker" (Berlin 1973, 8) . Commenting on the fact that Austin proposes to "make a fresh start on the problem" of defining the performative utterance half-way through How To Do Things With Words, Warnock reminds us that: "in lecturing, Austin was not merely expounding, he was teaching" (Austin 1975, 91 and Warnock 1989, 106) . Clearly, Austin felt that this method of guiding his students and readers through a re-enactment of his thought process would be more effective than offering a constructed, linear, and teleological argument.
Austin first introduced his theory of the performative utterance within the context of a seminar.
He continued to develop his ideas over the course of multiple lecture series, beginning with "Words and Deeds", and followed by the William James Lectures, which were in turn reused in later lectures PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 2 (2) (2017) at Oxford. In a sense, each communication was like a public performance of a work-in-progress.
Austin's writing process was an iterative one, in which oral and written communications fed back into each other, as in a loop. As such, his text was always already spoken, just as his speaking voice was always already textualized. This circular and iterative mechanics continued after Austin's death, with the eventual publication of How To Do Things With Words. That the book exists at all in its final published form owes everything to its editors; the text we have today, in which we situate the origin of performativity, is in fact a highly hybrid object.
The history of How To Do Things With Words, however, is not so uncommon. This is a point Martin
Puchner made in his opening keynote at the colloquium "Theatre, Performance, Philosophy:
Crossings and Transfers in Anglo-American Thought". Over the course of history, Puchner recalled, prophets often disseminated their teachings orally. As a result, many historical texts were in fact "written" by the students of the master after his or her death. Citing Jesus, Muhammad, and
Socrates as ancient precedents, and Lacan and de Saussure as their contemporary equivalents, Puchner proposes that a closer look at these "scenes of instruction" could serve to problematize the priority or originality of the oral over the written word (Puchner 2014) . It is these ghosts-both Austin's ghost and the ghosts that haunt his ghost-that I hope to encounter through the medium of Austin's voice as I sit down to listen to the recording of "Performatives". As it turns out, however, I am not seduced by Austin's voice. His nasal, tenor tonality has something of a distancing effect on me. I am, on the other hand, quite affected by the experience. This is perhaps due to my knowledge that Austin died only three months after he delivered the Gothenburg lecture. Housed in these sound bytes, then, is the last known public, sonic record of his existence. To borrow a term from Derrida's semantic repertoire, the recording I am listening to represents a "trace"-"the mark of an anterior presence" (Spivak in Derrida 1997, xv). As Derrida described it, "a trace is never present, fully present, by definition; it inscribes in itself the reference to the specter of something else" (Derrida 2005, 151) .
The specter of something else. But what is this elusive "something else"? What if this "something else" only refers me to another spectral object and throws me into an eternal chain of citational hauntings? Here, I recall the words of performance studies scholar Peggy Phelan who alluded to
Freud when describing the difficulties of unearthing the relationship between the primary and the copy: "Any search for an origin is hysterical" (Phelan 2014) . Like Derrida's specter, Austin's voice is marked by a temporal ambiguity that attests to his "having-been present in a past now" (Derrida 1988, 20) . But what if he never manifests or makes himself present again? As I write this, I feel somewhat guilty, for the last thing I would want to do is offend a ghost….
MARCELLUS It is offended.
BERNARDO See, it stalks away! HORATIO Stay! speak, speak! I charge thee, speak!
Exit Ghost
Hamlet, Act I, Scene I PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 2 (2) (2017)
In his literary analysis, Miller portrays Austin as a man "who has exorcised a ghost only to find that it keeps coming back" and states that "literature is the ghost that haunts How to Do Things with Words". He refers to the "ghost of poetry that cannot be exorcised", and claims that Austin's literary allusions involve "an intrusive apparition of the etiolated". It is said that literature "keeps rising from the dead" (Miller 2001, 18, 37, 49, 40, respectively) .
The figure of the ghost is, of course, a common trope within performance studies discourse. Within these analyses, one particularly famous ghost makes a regular (re)appearance: that of Hamlet's
Father. Performance studies scholar Richard Schechner, for one, references Laurence Olivier's production of Hamlet in his well-known formula of double-negativity, the "not not me", which describes the scripted nature of performance and ritual. There, he suggests that when on stage,
Olivier both is and is not Hamlet, and that as such his words both do and do not belong to him, just as they do and do not belong to Shakespeare and to Hamlet (Schechner 1985, 92) .
In his 1993 work of political philosophy, Specters of Marx, Derrida makes multiple allusions to
Hamlet, thereby inviting us to consider the parallel between the ghost of an ideology haunting
Europe and the ghost that haunts Shakespeare's protagonist. There, Derrida introduces his concept of "hauntology"-a homophone for "ontology" in French-in order to describe the paradoxical state of physical absence and immaterial presence with which the ghost is imbued.
In its negotiation between presence and absence, the voice may be said to be inherently "hauntological". It strikes me that performativity resides at the locus of the same series of binary oppositions as the voice-those of presence and absence, materiality and immateriality, discursivity and corporeality, speech and writing, lack and excess. Austin's performative voice (a voice which vehicles a discourse about performativity) is produced by and within his body, yet it escapes and exceeds it.
In his famous essay "The Grain of the Voice", Roland Barthes theorizes the space of "encounter" or "friction" between language and voice as something that transcends the linguistic by implicating the "materiality of the body" (Barthes 1977, 182) . There, he gives the name of the "grain" to "the body in the voice as it sings, the hand as it writes, the limb as it performs" (Barthes 1977, 182) .
Within this wonderful formula, we may understand the grain of the voice as the intersection between orality, writing, and performance-the three elements at play within Austinian performativity. Austin's voice (which is both spoken and written) emerges through a process of writing (which is also speech). However, as I listen to Austin's lecture, I realize that unlike the apparition of Hamlet's father who, in the opening scene of the play is visible, but mute, Austin's ghost is invisible, but audible. He speaks, albeit acousmatically. PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 2 (2) (2017) Enter Ghost Hamlet, Act I, Scene I
In 1955 (the same year that Austin gave the celebrated William James Lectures), the French composer and founder of concrete music Pierre Schaeffer published an article in which he used the term "acousmatic" to describe the experience of hearing a sound whose productive source is not visible. Shaeffer explains that the term, whose etymology derives from the Greek word ἀκουσματικοί (akousmatikos) that stems from the root ἀκούω (akouō, "I hear"), was originally attributed to the uninitiated auditors (i.e. disciples) of the ancient Greek philosopher Pythagoras.
Legend holds that the students in Pythagoras' sect underwent three years of training followed by five years of silence before they were elevated to the status of the mathêmatikoi, or the learned.
During this probationary period, the disciples were obliged to listen to their master's lectures from behind a black curtain. Only the initiated were privy to the ritualistic ceremonies of the Pythagorean order that took place behind this mysterious veil. Only they were permitted to see their master. The uninitiated were obliged to listen acousmatically.
For Schaeffer, the "ancient tradition" of Pythagoras and his students finds its contemporary equivalent in modern technologies such as the radio and the phonograph, where seeing and listening are dissociated (Schaeffer 2004, 77) . Schaeffer describes the acousmatic experience in terms evocative of a Husserlian phenomenological reduction. By bracketing out the thing-in-itself and concentrating on the thing-as-perceived, the listener achieves a heightened awareness of the content of perception. What emerges is a "sound object" (un objet sonore) that "marks the perceptive reality of sound as such, as distinguished from the modes of its production and transmission" (Schaeffer 2004, 77) .
The French film critic Michel Chion takes up Schaeffer's work on acousmatic sound in his 1999 book
The Voice in Cinema, noting that because hearing (as opposed to vision) is omnidirectional, "the acousmêtre is everywhere" (Chion 1999, 24 scenes"-scenes that act as "founding fiction(s)" about our cultural origins: "Concentrated within the idea of myth is perhaps the entire presentation on the part of the West to appropriate its own origin, or to take away its secret, so that it can at last identify itself, absolutely, around its own pronouncement and its own birth" (Nancy 1991, 53) . More poignant than uncovering the historical "truth" about the "origin" of the Pythagorean veil, at least for my own purposes here, is to question this desire to identify a precise origin.
Over two millennia later, far removed both spatially and temporally from ancient Greece, I, too, I was informed by the generous professors at the University of Gothenburg that there were many complications in digitalizing the recording of Austin's lecture due to the fragile state of the original tape. Furthermore, because of the unusual speed at which the lecture was recorded, it had first to be slowed down and then sped up in order to recreate the original tempo of Austin's voice. Finally, because the mp3 file was too large, it had to be ripped in a smaller bitrate and converted into mono so that it could be sent to me via email. What I am listening to, then, is an object that has been highly manipulated in order to achieve the effect of the natural or the original. As Schaeffer argues, "…although it is materialized by the magnetic tape [here the mp3], the object….is not on the tape either. What is on the tape is only the magnetic trace of a signal" (Schaeffer 2004, 79) .
In 1959, this recording saved Austin's signifiers from disappearing immediately after their utterance. Severed from their origin, they continue to act in the absence of their productive source. PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 2 (2) (2017)
The uncanny technology of sound reproduction enables the voice to continue to perform and to exert agency in the absence, and even after the death, of its author. Applying Schechner's formula of double negativity to Schaeffer's theorization of a recording as a magnetic trace of a signal, the sonorous object with which I interact may be said to be "not not Austin". (It both and is not Austin).
The recording deconstructs the hierarchy between source and signal. It also produces a substitute body-one that is both technological and textualized.
As I listen to Austin's embodied/disembodied/re-embodied voice (which he might have described with his famous term "etiolated"), it strikes me that his parasite-the ghost of fiction-has come back to haunt him, although in another sense than Miller proposed. The technology through which Austin disseminated his lecture eventually turned him into a ghost. This, then, is the fundamental uncanniness of telecommunications. Speech (which is always already writing) circles back on itself
and becomes yet another form of writing. Because it is produced by and within the body, the voice gives the impression of a direct and intimate link to the subjectivity, and even the very flesh, of the other. But at the same time, it is marked by an absence, a lack, and the impossibility of this connection. Austin seems displaced, and my efforts to reach him seem increasingly to be in vain.
In the recording, Austin's lecture is followed by a question and answer session, in which his voice With that, the recording cuts off. Once again, I find myself surrounded by silence and by another kind of absence. The ghost is gone. Or is it? And so I end as I began: with a consciousness of consciousness, and with the waiting for an apparition. "Any search for an origin is hysterical".
Full stop.
